Nurse Spreads Word That Patient Has AIDS A Case For Medical Malpractice?
	Difference Between Ordinary Negligence And Medical Malpractice
	Not Every Act of Negligence Toward a Patient Constitutes Medical Malpractice

Ms. Lynn Nowlin Bryant, a licensed practical nurse employed by Warner Brown Hospital, gave information to a relative that appellant, Ronald Wyatt, a hospital patient either had acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or was being tested for AIDS. As a result, Mr. Wyatt sued Ms. Bryant and Warner Brown Hospital's insurance company, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul). The trial court found in essence that the allegations raised by Ronald and Vicki Wyatt against parties did not constitute medical malpractice pursuant to Arkansas law and granted motions for summary judgment in the parties favor.

Facts: The appellant, Ronald Wyatt, was admitted to Warner Brown Hospital in El Dorado, Arkansas, for evaluation and treatment resulting from sudden onset of paralysis, weakness, slurred speech, and other symptoms. Mr. Wyatt was given a magnetic resonance imaging scan which revealed that his condition was consistent with "moderately extensive multiple sclerosis and AIDS cannot be excluded."

One of the appellees, Lynn Nowlin Bryant, was a licensed practical nurse employed by Warner Brown Hospital during Mr. Wyatt's hospitalization. Prior to learning of his test results, she told Suzanne Bryant, the manager of the Exxon Store in Hampton, Arkansas (and also the wife of Lynn's husband's first cousin), either that Mr. Wyatt had AIDS or that he was being tested for AIDS (the facts are in dispute as to this point). According to Lynn Bryant's deposition, she wanted to convey this information to Suzanne because:

I knew that she worked with him when he delivered cakes to the store and I guess that I was maybe concerned for her health if he did in fact have it. I told Suzanne Bryant that Ronald Wyatt, who I found out from a nurse on my shift was a routeman for Dolly Madison, was being tested for AIDS, and three or four days later when the test results came back, I did tell her that they were negative and he had multiple sclerosis.

Mr. Wyatt and his wife filed two complaints against Ms. Bryant, alleging that her statements to a third party that he "had AIDS" constituted medical negligence, medical malpractice, invasion of privacy, defamation by slander, and the tort of outrage. His wife, claimed as her cause of action that she suffered and continues to suffer loss of consortium and mental anguish. The Wyatts also filed a similar complaint against the hospital's insurer, St. Paul.

The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment against the patient on the count of medical malpractice alone. The case went to the Supreme Court.

Court Decision: First, the court defined two terms:

(1) "Action for medical injury" means any action against a medical care provider, whether based in tort, contract or otherwise, to recover damages on account of medical injury;

(2) "Medical injury" or "injury" means any adverse consequences arising out of or sustained in the course of the professional services being rendered by a medical care provider, whether resulting from negligence, error or omission in the performance of such service; or of warranty or in violation of contract; or from failure to diagnose; or from premature abandonment of a patient or of a course of treatment; or from failure to properly maintain equipment or appliances necessary to the rendition of such services; or otherwise arising out of or sustained in the course of such services.

Applying this rationale, it is clear that the actions of Lynn Bryant in revealing confidential information she acquired at work did not fall within our expressed view of what constitutes a medical injury.

In further evaluating this issue, we consider the rationale of a New York Supreme Court decision in Tighe v. Ginsberg, 540 N.Y.S.2d 99, 146 A.D.2d 268 (1989) helpful. There, the plaintiff visited the defendant doctor for treatment of a hearing problem and sued him when the doctor disclosed his medical records without authorization. In determining which statute of limitations applied, the New York court held that this "unauthorized disclosure" was an action sounding in negligence and not in medical malpractice. As the New York court stated, "Although in a general sense a doctor furnishes medical care to patients, clearly not every act of negligence toward a patient constitutes medical malpractice."

The distinction between ordinary negligence and malpractice turns on whether the actors or omissions complained of involve a matter of medical science or art requiring special skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons or whether the conduct complained of can instead be assessed on the basis of common everyday experience of the truer of facts. Where their matter requires the consideration of the professional skill and knowledge of the practitioner of the medical facility, the more specialized theory of medical malpractice applies.

In sum, we are not inclined to extend the definition of medical injury to the facts before us, and we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor or St. Paul and Ms. Bryant.

Editor's Note: The Supreme Court of Arkansas decided this case on a narrow platform of medical malpractice; it did not have to consider if there was cause for action for slander and breach of confidentiality. It, therefore, sided with the trial court and held that there was no medical malpractice when the nurse made those "unauthorized disclosures." The nurse may well have slandered the patient and breached the nurse-patient confidentiality. 

Wyatt, v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance, 315 Ark. 547; 868 S.W.2d 505; 1994 Ark.